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Abstract
This paper makes the argument that though Argentina’s 2001 financial
crisis was influenced by several factors, it is the 1991 Convertibility Plan that
most strongly pushed the nation to the point of needing outside financial
assistance. Its implementation led to and worked in combination with a
multitude of unexpected factors. Together, these created economic conditions
that chipped away at the stability of Argentina’s economy.
Given the nature of this project, information was gathered solely
through research in texts published by both supporters and critics of
organizations like the International Monetary Fund. In my readings, I found
that there is generally more criticism than praise, though I tried not to be
swayed too strongly either way. Ultimately, however, it became clear that a
decision on outside organizations did not need to be made. Rather, it was clear
that a criticism of policy would suffice.
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Executive Summary
This paper examines the factors that led to the 2001 financial crisis in
Argentina. In this examination the claim is made that the 1991 convertibility
regime was the main catalyst for the circumstances that led to the dire state of
Argentina’s economy and ultimately left the nation without credit on a global
scale.
Established by President Carlos Menem and Economy Minister
Domingo Cavallo, the 1991 convertibility regime was implemented as a
response to the decades of economic instability and chronic inflation that
Argentina had suffered from. Prior to its installation, the nation’s Central
Bank had turned towards printing money, instigating inflation and making it
an unattractive nation for investors and foreign capital. To remedy this, the
convertibility regime limited the Central Bank’s ability to print money and
tried to create a more appealing economic atmosphere for investors. Pegging
the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar on a one-to-one basis and creating new
restrictions did this. The issue was that success was short-term. That is, the
expected results were achieved during a limited period of years. However, the
benefits of the convertibility plan were ultimately overshadowed by the
unexpected consequences.
Upon its implementation, the convertibility plan instigated a series of
planned results along with many unintended consequences. Restrictions were
put in place, such as limiting the Central Bank’s control and forbidding it from
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printing money. Initially, these aided in achieving the goals of the
convertibility plan. Inflation was lowered to single digits within several years
and the economy saw significant growth. Additionally, the Real Gross
Domestic Product rose to double digits. The Real Gross Domestic Product
(Real GDP) looks at the Gross Domestic Product of a nation and adjusts for
inflation. Growth in Real GDP is typically a strong indicator of positive
movement in an economy. So, it in combination with lowered inflation, imply
that the convertibility plan was successful in achieving its goals.
Achievement could also be seen in the influx of foreign capital into
Argentina. The US dollar had grown strong over the decades and this made
currencies connected to it attractive by association. When the convertibility
plan pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar, investing in Argentina
became a more secure and compelling decision for foreign investors.
Additionally, the high interest rates in Argentina drew in foreign investors,
because they were sure to receive a premium in return for their money.
Although this was initially a benefit for Argentina, it ultimately became an
area of vulnerability.
Argentina’s attractiveness to foreign capital was contingent upon its
economic stability. During the 1990s decade, external shocks revealed
Argentina’s economic insecurity and the extent to which it was affected by
events elsewhere around the world. For example, Mexico’s Tequila Crisis,
Russia’s default, and the depreciation of the Brazilian real all translated to
economic issues for Argentina. When these occurred, Argentina’s economy
6

revealed the extent to which it was dependent upon other economies,
particularly those attached to the dollar.
In these moments of weakness, the entry of foreign capital lowered.
Argentina’s consequent suffering revealed that the nation was too reliant upon
it. This was exemplified in the domestic markets’ inabilities to support
Argentina’s financial needs when they most needed to. That is, when foreign
capital was not available for use, Argentina’s economy could not survive on
its own. Here it begins to be clear that the convertibility plan forced Argentina
to become reliant upon foreign capital. It simply replaced the action of
printing money (the inflationary practices that had previously been employed)
with spending with borrowed money. This becomes very clear when
considering the nation’s debt dynamics and trade balance.
The convertibility plan led Argentina to stifle its own domestic
economy while becoming dependent upon and utilizing foreign capital. This is
undeniably clear when considering the nation’s lowered exportation and sharp
increase in importation of goods. Essentially, this means that they were
buying more than they were selling—and, what’s worse, they were doing so
with borrowed money in the form of foreign capital. The fiscal policies of
Argentina reflect this irresponsibility, whose unsustainable nature was
reflected in federal spending.
The nature of Argentina’s institutional and political structure is also
attributed to the 2001 financial crisis, although the convertibility regime bears
a correlation to this as well. Systematically, Argentina’s structure makes it
7

difficult to enforce regulations, such as those that were mandated as
restrictions for the convertibility plan. The politics are such that provincial
governments have the potential to bypass orders from the federal government,
rendering the convertibility regime’s limits nearly useless. Additionally, the
political system appeared to be relatively unstable with several resignations
from major leaders within days of each other. This insecurity registers as
overall instability for investors, which leads to the withdrawal of foreign
capital. It is here that the unexpected results of the convertibility plan are
shown. It was implemented in a nation where structural issues could lead to a
failure of upholding restrictions. This, in combination with the vulnerabilities
it created, ultimately made it ineffective. Although well intended, the
convertibility plan ultimately generated more negative consequences than it
did success.
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Advice to Future Honors Students
My best advice for future Honors students is to pick a topic that you
will be able to maintain an interest in and a curiosity for. This process is very
long and, at times, its completion can feel impossible. There is no worse
decision to make than to choose a topic that you have limited interest in.
Equally important is that you are capable of having a dynamic approach to
completing your proposed project. For this paper, for example, I initially
excelled in finding readings and conducting research, but struggled in
constructing my own views on the subject.
Advice that you will likely hear from every present and past Honors
student is to work hard early on, so as to make life a little easier when
everything else gets piled on. Manage your time wisely and above all, respect
what your adviser has to say!
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Preface
Nearly every nation in Latin America has suffered economic turmoil
over the past century. While economic turbulence certainly extends further
beyond this in history, it is over the past few decades that a distinct pattern has
developed in which very similar remedies were employed in each troubled
nation. The implemented solutions are typically heavily neoliberal and are
instilled under the recommendation of international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
This Capstone Presentation began with my intentions of researching
the policies and patterns implemented in Latin America. My beginning
research led to a decision to narrow my scope, which I did by specifically
choosing the nation of Argentina and its 2001 economic collapse. What began
as research on implemented neoliberal policies, ultimately led to the decision
to examine the factors leading to Argentina’s economic collapse, the
subsequent responses and solutions of both the nation and are drafted
International Monetary Fund.
Although many of the contributors to the demise of Argentina’s
economy were specific to the nation, many were also due to the nation’s
contingency upon the success of other nations and transactions. This made the
research very interesting and, perhaps more importantly, translatable to other
situations. It is here that I made the decision to draw comparisons between the
current situation in Greece and this past interaction. Although the writing is
largely focused on Argentina’s financial crisis (because it has been the
regional and economic focus from the start), the inclusion of a crossexamination of Greece offers a more dynamic approach and superior subject
matter for this paper.
Given this connection, this paper is meant to explore and express the
delicate balance that is the result of an increasingly globalized and
interconnected economic world. Certainly, there are benefits and in many
cases reduced risk when there is a financial system supported by and/or
bearing connections to other currencies or nations. For example, many
consider Greece’s fate to not be sealed only because of its use of the Euro and
its ability to fall back on stronger nations such as Germany and France. Some
extremists, however, argue that Greece’s situation will lead to the demise of
the Euro-using nations altogether. Although both of these arguments,
particularly the latter, are relatively extreme, the overarching theme is that
there is a strong correlation between nations and their fates are somewhat tied
to one another. An examination of Argentina’s past issues, alongside Greece’s
present ones, exemplifies this. It is in drawing attention to this that this paper
succeeds in bringing light to an important connection from which much can be
learned.
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Introduction

According to the Independent Evaluation Office, “Until the depositor
runs started to accelerate in the spring of 2001, the Argentina banking system
was considered to be a model for emerging market economies in terms of
prudential standards, capitalization, and liquidity.1” The question remains,
what transitioned Argentina’s system from exemplary to insolvent? The
reality is that there are a multitude of accused factors that together worked to
create a climate that provoked the demise of Argentina’s economic reforms. In
an evaluation of the circumstances performed by the aforementioned
Independent Evaluation Office (although it bears a connection to the
International Monetary Fund in its origin, the Independent Evaluation Office
[founded in 20012] claims complete independence from the Fund and its past
decisions), there have been a total of eight distinct factors indentified, ranging
from external shocks to the decline in capital flows.

The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003.
2
The Independent Evaluation Office, 2014.
1
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss these conditions existing in
Argentina’s economy that forced the nation to seek financial help from an
external organization. Essentially, put under a spotlight will be the underlying
factors that created the imbalance that forced the nation to need financial
assistance. Additionally, Argentina’s subsequent credit-worthiness will be
noted—namely the nation’s indebtedness to foreign currency. Given that it is
today still unable to re-enter the global credit market, it is clear that the
nation’s default on debt and currency devaluation has had lasting effects on
the nation’s success on a global stage. In today’s economic world, in fact, it is
seemingly used as a cautionary tale for nations with large fiscal deficits that
hope to finance large fiscal deficits by accessing global debt markets, like
Greece.
Although there are a number of factors typically held responsible for
the economic and financial disruptions, I would like to make the argument
that the convertibility regime was the central player in the Argentine financial
crisis. Certainly other areas of influence existed, but ultimately it was the
convertibility plan and both its intended and unintended consequences that
contributed the most in creating the nation’s difficult financial climate.

14

Chapter One:
The Convertibility Plan

The Origin and Actions of the Plan
Established in April 1991, the Convertibility Plan seems to have
paradoxically contributed to both the support and the demise of Argentina’s
economic structure. In its creation, the Convertibility Plan was intended as a
solution to the chronic inflation problem that the nation faced. It seems that
irresponsible money printing from the Argentine Central Bank, in
combination with several other factors, had led to decades of inflation and
economic insecurity for the nation. Subsequently, it was globally viewed as an
unstable investment for foreign investors.
The nation was in need of a change and they found it in the form of the
convertibility regime. So, what exactly was the convertibility regime? In
short, “President Carlos Menem and Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo
established a new exchange regime for the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar
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and limited the Central Bank’s ability to create new money by requiring it to
back the monetary base with foreign exchange reserves3.”
According to Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy,
“The essential objective of the plan was to end decades of financial and
economic instability by ensuring that Argentina would have sound money.
This was to be accomplished by linking the value of the domestic currency at
parity to the US dollar, with the guarantee that pesos could be exchanged for
dollars at will. The Argentine Central Bank was given independence from the
government, under the mandate that it maintain convertibility by holding
dollar reserves against its domestic monetary liabilities (currency and
commercial bank reserves).”4 Pegging the peso to the US dollar offered a
more appealing currency for foreign investors to rely on, whose subsequent
capital would benefit Argentina. A very similar experiment had been tried in
the 1970s by Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz and Central Bank president
Adolf Diz with less extreme but almost identical consequences.
Originally, this currency board system, which matched the US dollar
to the peso on a one-to-one basis5, was an appealing solution to Argentina—
and was later even supported by the International Monetary Fund.6 In addition

Joseph P. Joyce, The IMF and Global Financial Crises: Phoenix Rising?
(2012), 127.
4
Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002),
20.
5
Global Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Todd A. Knoop, 2013, page
133.
6
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, IEO, 2003.

3

16

to being pegged to the U.S. dollar, the peso would be fully backed by foreign
reserves in order to maintain confidence in the currency7.
Professor Knoop of Cornell College explains the expected outcome:
“The idea behind this currency board was to credibly reduce money growth
and inflation while at the same time fixing the exchange rate of the peso to the
dollar. In addition, the currency board promised to protect the independence
of a Central Bank that had shown itself to be part and parcel of the volatile
Argentinian political system. In other words, the currency board would be a
way to force the Central Bank of Argentina to make the tough decisions it had
never been able to make in the past.8”

Restrictions
Defense mechanisms were put in place to aid in the avoidance of the
inflation that Argentina’s economy had often fallen prey to. For example, in
emergency situations a 100 percent reserve requirement could easily transition
to an 80 percent requirement, while the Central Bank could hold up to 20
percent of its assets in government debt.9 Additionally, the Central Bank was
forbidden from printing money to finance governmental expenditures, thus

Todd A. Knoop, Global Finance in Emerging Market Economies (2013),
133.
8
Todd A. Knoop, Global Finance in Emerging Market Economies (2013),
133.
9
Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002).
7
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building a mechanism to avoid the aforementioned perpetual problem in
Argentina of expeditious inflation.10
The above limits and others installed were intended to prevent a
defense against the past issues that the Argentine and similar economies had
suffered from. They, along with the entire convertibility regime, were
representative of a progression away from old toxic habits and towards new
opportunities.

10

Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002).
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Chapter Two:
The Intended Results

Tackling Inflation
The convertibility regime’s implementation followed decades of
economic and financial unrest in Argentina. One of the largest blanket issues
that the plan aimed to tackle was inflation. This issue is typically derived from
the lack of political independence of the Central Bank. In the case of
Argentina, the Central Bank had been chronically been charged as the arm of
the government for achieving social goods. The measures taken under the
convertibility regime, it seems, were initially effective. According to the
Independent Evaluation Office, “After the adoption of the Convertibility Plan,
stabilization was achieved quickly and with the aid of structural reforms, the
19

economy grew at an average rate of 6 percent per year through 1997.11” As
can be seen in the diagram12 below, inflation did somewhat drop off with
these installments.

In fact, Argentina’s inflation fell to single digits by 1993. This is the result of
the initial monetary stability that came with the outcomes of the convertibility
regime. In its implementation, the plan led to an influx of foreign capital
based on its attractiveness and stability to foreign investors.
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003, 3.
12
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003.
11
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Real GDP Growth
In addition to the above alteration in inflation, the convertibility plan
originally resulted in Real GDP growth—a relative contrast to the trends in
the 1980s. This can also be seen in the previous chart, particularly the rise to
about 10 percent in 1992. The chart below looks at a five year moving average
of the Real GDP growth for Argentina.13

With the exception of changes made by events such as the 1995 Tequila
Crisis, which resulted in a plummet of economic activity, the Real GDP

13

Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002).
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appears to exhibit growth.14 Both the growth in Real GDP and the lowering of
inflation were intended factors for the convertibility regime.

Tapping Global Credit Markets
To its credit, the convertibility regime opened Argentina’s doors to
opportunities for foreign investors to enter the market. What made the
Argentine market so appealing was the peso’s backing of the U.S. dollar. The
United States’ increasing economic stability was rendering it the economic
powerhouse of the west. Argentina’s attachment to its currency cast a positive
light on the peso, making it more attractive. Foreign investors were drawn in
by the assurance of such a strong currency and an influx of foreign capital
ensued. The aforementioned rise in GDP indicates this. Along with the
advantageous attachment to the U.S. dollar, investors were also drawn in
by the high interest rates. Note the graph15 on the following page .The spread
of interest rates indicate that foreign investors would benefit from placing
foreign capital in the Argentine market. These features were initially
beneficial to the Argentine economy, as displayed in the growth of Real GDP
and the lowered inflation. In a way, when looking at these aspects and this
time period, it could be argued that the convertibility plan was successful. It
did, after all, achieve its goals in the short-term. Ultimately, however, the

14
15

Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002).
Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002).
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intended results were short-lived while unintended consequences proved to be
far more damaging.
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Chapter Three:
The Unintended Consequences

External Shocks and Decline in Capital Flow
In spite of the positive activity that seemed to be occurring,
there were in reality deeper and more negative factors at play. The short-term
successes of the convertibility plan were overshadowed by its deficiencies and
unintended consequences. The overarching issue with this situation seems to
be that while money growth and inflation may have been corrected, it was not
a solution to the economic turmoil of Argentina. Rather, the Convertibility
Plan seems to have created an artificial access to foreign markets that lulled
the nation into a false sense of security. The insecurity of this regime can be
exemplified in external episodes that affected the nation’s economy. Mexico’s
Tequila Crisis, Russia’s default, and the depreciation of the Brazilin real all
exemplify the fragility that the convertibility regime impressed upon the
Argentine economy. The instability stems from an influx of foreign capital as
a result of the peg of the peso to the dollar.
24

Two of the unexpected consequences of the convertibility regime are
strongly intermingled and carry a great deal of power in their ability to
translate into modern-day issues. In an increasingly globalized world, there
are a plethora of benefits that can come to individuals, firms, and
governments. Increased communication and trade on an international scale has
led to greater capabilities in terms of efficiency, cost, and so on. However, one
could argue that it has also led to a drastic sense of dependency between
sovereign nations, firms, and individuals. That is to say, the globalized world
has led to a much more fragile and intermingled set of interactions in which
activity in one part of the world can greatly affect activity elsewhere. The
strong correlation between the decline in capital flows and external shocks
exemplify this reliance and the effect that it can have. More so, however, it
displays a major unintended consequence of the convertibility plan.
Firstly, let us focus on the decline in capital flows and the
phenomenon’s effect on the crisis. At the hands of the convertibility plan,
Argentina’s reliance on capital inflows was too heavy. That is, the nation’s
domestic financial markets were merely slowly developing and could not
support the nation’s needs if there were to be an international shift and the
capital flows were to falter.
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When such a shift did occur, the domestic markets seemed incapable
of supporting the financial needs of Argentina16. The 2003 I.E.O. report
elaborates: “When there was a sharp reduction (or “sudden stop” as it is
sometimes called) in global capital flows to emerging market economies in
1998, it became increasingly costly for Argentina to raise funds on
international capital markets. When the investors sensed a shift, the money
fled. Because of the convertibility regime, and because of the relatively small
size of its export sector, Argentina could not easily adapt to the shock through
a rapid depreciation of the real exchange rate.17”
The unpredictable swinging of global capital flows in combination
with the nation’s poor domestic financial infrastructure worked together to
contribute to the collapse in Argentina’s economy. This is exemplified in the
intense and continued rise on Argentina’s bonds over U.S. Treasuries, as seen
in the graph18 on the following page. It is in this example that we can see the
correlation between the decline in capital flows and the series of adverse
external shocks—and how their connection is through the convertibility
regime.

The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003, 6.
17
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003, 5-6.
18
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003, 4.
16

26

The external shocks show Argentina’s vulnerability to the decisions of
foreign investors. Similarly to the less-stable nations in the European Union
(i.e. Greece), Argentina seems to have initially benefited from the
performance and conditions of others. During the successful times in
Argentina’s economic history, it seems to have often been because of
favorable conditions elsewhere. External shocks, however, led to the fast
deterioration of these favorable circumstances, ultimately leading Argentina—
so delicately holding on to the coattails of others—to suffer.
The I.E.O. elaborates with examples: “Among the external shocks
were the Russian/LTCM crises of 1998, which led to a reduction in capital
flows to emerging market economies and an increase in risk premia; the
devaluation of the Brazilian real, which had a negative impact on the
27

competitiveness of Argentina’s exports; and the appreciation of the U.S. dollar
against most currencies in the late 1990s, which increased Argentina’s real
effective exchange rate; and the global economic slowdown that started in the
beginning of 2001, which depressed the price of Argentina’s main exports,”
19

. Argentina’s performance is contingent upon the success or demise, in

Brazil’s case, of others. This unintended result of the convertibility regime left
Argentina more vulnerable to the global markets than ever. It is in these
aspects that Argentina is most commonly used as a cautionary tale for other
nations. A delicate balance such as this ought to be maneuvered so that the
proportions of international and domestic vulnerability are lowered. The
convertibility regime did quite the opposite.

Structural Reform and Debt Dynamics
Somewhat homogenous to the two aforementioned are the issues with
structural reform in Argentina’s economy. Reportedly, in order to adhere to
new policies, there needed to be a liberalization of certain markets (i.e.
product markets, foreign trade, utilities and infrastructure20) and an overall
limitation on imports. A report states, “While many direct and indirect trade
barriers were removed, and while exports did grow steadily, by the end of the

The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003, 6.
20
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003.
19
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1990s Argentina was still a relatively closed economy.”21 This is directly
connected to the aforementioned external shocks and decline in capital flow,
given that a balance was lost when the number of exports did not nearly meet
the number of imports or use of foreign capital.
The imbalance mentioned above very simply describes an instrumental
element of the issue of Argentina’s debt dynamics. Essentially, the nature of
Argentina’s trade balance—and the duly noted trade barriers—created debt to
the nations from whom they were importing. Given that exportation was
lesser, the imbalance is relatively easily explained.
Consider the Trade and Current Account Balance on the following
page.22 The current account is perpetually negative—though it shrinks during
the 1995 Tequila Crisis. Although the trade balance does not have the same
negative consistency, it is not necessarily steady in any particular direction. It
seems that while the inflation remained low and the Real GDP great
throughout the 1990s, as intended by the convertibility plan, the underlying
factors outweighed these two benefits in terms of overall influence on the state
of the economy.

The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003.
22
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003.
21
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Of the underlying factors, it appears that exports—or lack thereof,
comparatively—was one of the largest outcomes of the convertibility plan that
affected the state of the balance sheet. This is also reflected in the nation’s
breakdown of debt.

30

As can be seen in the graphic23 the following page, in comparison to
the similarly featured nations of Chile, New Zealand, Spain, and Turkey,
Argentina has incredibly low export ratio in the years between 1967 and 2001.
Export Ratios (in percent of GDP) 1967-2001: Argentina,
Chile, New Zealand, Spain, and Turkey

This lack of export ratio strength or, for that matter, linear growth, is a
result of the installment and consequent repercussions of the Convertibility
Plan. In the years following the implementation of the convertibility regime,
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003.
23
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Argentina’s exports declined while the number of imports increased relatively
dramatically. The largest issue with this is that the increasing number of
imports is funded by the savings generated by foreign exchange, not by
domestic production. Essentially, these imports are made with borrowed

money generated by temporary foreign investment. That is, it is funded by the
foreign capital of investors that can easily remove their money when scared.
This dependency was created by the convertibility plan and forced the
Argentine economy to take on an even greater imbalance between exports and
imports.

Fiscal Policies
The convertibility regime unintentionally created an atmosphere that
perpetuated and even worsened the fiscal policies of Argentina. Often
described as chronically unstable, Argentina’s unsustainable fiscal policies are
seemingly inherent to the nation, given their frequency. On the surface, it is
seemingly a simple issue of living beyond their means. That is to say, the
Argentine government spends more than can or is collected in taxes when
satisfying political needs and pressures24. The tendency is to then satiate the
political needs and pressures by borrowing domestically and internationally,

24

Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002).
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wherever credit is available25. In an increasingly globalized marketplace, and
because of the dollar-backed peso, credit in the form of investment of foreign
capital in Argentina became easily accessible. Naturally, it was made all the
more available by the convertibility regime and the appeal that it created for
foreign investors. The consequential fiscal realities versus Argentina’s targets
over the years can be seen graphically26 below.

Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002).
The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July
2003.
25

26
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With some dramatic liberties, Mussa describes the habits of the
Argentine government: “This is what happened during the presidency of Raul
Alfonsin, culminating in the hyperinflation of 1990. With some differences in
the details, but none of the central substance, it is also what happened in the
events that culminated in several earlier financial crises during the preceding
50 years. Thus, in the management of its fiscal affairs, the Argentine
government is like a chronic alcoholic—once it starts to imbibe the political
pleasures of deficit spending, it keeps on going until it reaches the economic
equivalent of falling down drunk.27” The fiscal policies of the decade of 19902000 seemed to mimic these issues on an even more extreme and more
irresponsible level that has continued to affect the nation into today. The
unreasonable spending, funded by false currency, worked in unison with the

Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002)
10.
27
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other factors to ruin the credit and economic stability of Argentina.

Institutional and Political Factors
The institutional and political factors involved in Argentina are
perhaps the least mutable of the contributors to the economic crisis, given
their relation to the electoral process and the governmental structure.
However, their influence on Argentina’s fate became stronger when foreign
capital entered following the convertibility plan’s implementation. The status
of the institution and political figures of a nation can be an indicator to foreign
investors of the stability. That is, when there are low turnover rates for
positions and responsible decisions are made, investors see security. This
connection is an unanticipated and detrimental result of the convertibility
plan.
In the 1990s and well before then, the federal government was
incapable of strongly implementing and adhering to any new fiscal policies,
particularly those regarding austerity measures. An I.E.O. report indicates that
firstly the issue of the electoral politics existed.28 That is, the need for votes
led to activity from elected officials to be lax.29 Similarly, there remained an
issue with the provincial governments. It seems that the provincial
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governments were given both too much power and responsibility, particularly
in comparison with the federal government. That is, “In general, the
considerable power of the provincial governments, in a context where
provinces had been entrusted with major public expenditure responsibilities,
greatly reduced the flexibility of fiscal policy.”30
Systematically, the institution of Argentina’s politics makes it very
difficult for policies to be strictly adhered to. During this decade of
Argentina’s economic turmoil, the nation also appeared to be plagued by low
retention rates for political leaders. The constantly altering cabinet members
in Argentina’s federal government seemed to drastically lower confidence
from both the domestic and international point of view. For example, the
resignation of Vice President Carlos Álvarez in October 2000 and the
successive resignations of two ministers of economy (José Luis Machinea and
Ricardo López Murphy) occurred all within twenty days in March.31 The
lowered confidence is best exemplified in the aforementioned reduction in
capital flows. Lowered confidence as the result of institutional and political
instability can be detrimental to a nation, as they the income of capital can
shift or cease altogether.
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Chapter 4: The Result

The Banking System
As part of the convertibility regime, the Central Bank of Argentina
was meant to act as a lender only as a last resort.32 For example, in emergency
situations a 100 percent reserve requirement could easily transition to an 80
percent requirement, while the Central Bank could hold up to 20 percent of its
assets in government debt.33 However, the combined economic factors (e.g.
the flight of foreign capital, external factors, etc.) essentially forced the nation
to turn back to their Central Bank.
A report elaborates: “By the end of 2001…. the cumulative effects of
several years’ recession, a year’s capital flight and a series of controversial
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policy moves had left the banking system vulnerable to any further blows to
public confidence. It has widely been argued that the manner in which
authorities tried to manage the exit from convertibility—including the legally
ambiguous measures to block deposits, and the forced conversion of dollardenominated bank assets and liabilities into pesos at asymmetric rates—
compounded these weaknesses. As a result, Argentina entered 2002 with not
only a currency and sovereign debt crisis, but a banking crisis as well.”34 The
picture that is painted is reflective of the reality that the convertibility plan
was unsustainable and inappropriate for Argentina’s economy. Further, it
depicts the overarching message that the convertibility regime resulted in far
more unintended and harmful outcomes than it did positive results.

Conclusion
When considering any financial situation, it is difficult to distinguish
or pinpoint one overarching reason for the ensuing economic disarray. In the
case of the Argentine crisis, the Independent Evaluation Office found eight
factors: fiscal policy, the convertibility regime, decline in capital flows,
structural reform, institutional and political factors, external shocks, debt
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dynamics, and the banking system35. Although each of these influences were
all intricate pieces in the ensuing economic environment, one stands out as
having the strongest impact on the economic stability of Argentina. This
influential element is the convertibility regime and the false sense of security
that it created.
Pegging the peso to the US dollar intentionally made investment in the
Argentine economy more appealing to those with foreign capital. The high
interest rates, backed by the US dollar, make a comfortable situation for a
foreign investor. From the Argentine perspective, it seems that only the
income of money was seen, and not the fragility that resulted. The growth in
the Gross Domestic Product and trade account essentially allowed Argentina
to finance the governmental and national needs with borrowed money from
foreign investors.
It appears that the influx of foreign capital did not spark the production
expected in the economy, but rather financed the continued and increased
importation of goods. This, in combination with the poor institutional factors
and political decisions brought Argentina to its knees. And the majority of this
was at the hands of the 1991 Convertibility Plan. While other influences were
certainly at hand, it is ultimately the plan’s intended and more powerful
unintended consequences that forced Argentina into a position in which it
needed to turn to the International Monetary Fund for financial assistance.
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